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Public-Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) dial-in is a common way to join a 
teleconference (e.g., a teleconference meeting, etc.), which could be an audio-only 
teleconference or a video teleconference in which the audio portion of the call involves a 
PSTN path).  Many teleconference vendors provide toll-free numbers and/or other PSTN 
numbers that can be used to dial-in to a teleconference. However, PSTN call-in processes 
for teleconferences have not evolved much in the last decade and often experience 
problems.  This proposal seeks to address various problems/challenges associated with 
current PSTN call-in processes for teleconferences by providing novel techniques in which 
an extension is provided to the Secure Telephony Identity Revisited (STIR) Personal 
Assertion Token (PASSporT) JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Token (JWT) that 
includes a new claims section that can be encrypted and secured end-to-end (e2e) such that 
only an enterprise and/or a teleconference cloud can view the claims section, which can 
help a meeting cloud to learn an enterprise identity of a participant, can be used to enhance 
call experience while joining meetings, and/or can help users move from enterprise phones 




As noted, many audio-only/video teleconferences rely on toll-free or PSTN 
numbers that can be used to dial-in to a teleconference.  For example, up to 40-50% of 
participants in teleconferences have been found to utilize dial-in audio-only calls, of which, 
the majority of audio dial-in users can dial-in via a PSTN path either using a 
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corporate/enterprise device or a personal phones, which may or may not have a 
corporate/enterprise connection. 
However, PSTN call-in processes for teleconferences have not evolved much in the 
last decade and often experience problems.  For example, a meeting roster may not reflect 
participant information accurately, which can cause related analytics to be improper. 
Further, joining a meeting via PSTN typically involves entering a meeting identity, 
password, etc. each time, even if a participant is re-joining a same meeting. Still further, if 
a participant dials in via PSTN for the audio portion of an already joined meeting, the 
participant still has to enter all the details previously supplied; essentially, the meeting 
system does not have a way to relate an incoming Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) INVITE 
from a PSTN path as part of an already established session.  Further, it is not currently 
possible to pass data across a PSTN SIP path securely e2e without various Session Border 
Controllers (SBCs) looking at the data. 
Such problems can lead to sub-optimal experiences when participants want to use 
different devices to attend teleconferences (e.g., a PSTN path for audio dial-in, an 
application for sharing information, etc.) and/or for audio-only teleconferences. 
This proposal seeks to address various problems/challenges associated with current 
PSTN call-in processes for teleconferences by providing novel techniques in which an 
extension is provided to the Secure Telephony Identity Revisited (STIR) Personal 
Assertion Token (PASSporT) JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Token (JWT) that 
includes a new claims section that can be encrypted and secured end-to-end (e2e) such that 
only an enterprise and/or a teleconference cloud can view the claims section.  Techniques 
herein may leverage the STIR/SHAKEN (Signature-based Handling of Asserted 
information using toKENs) framework (as it is enforced globally) to provide the extension 
to the STIR PASSporT JWT token, which can help a meeting cloud to learn an enterprise 
identity of a participant, can be used to enhance call experience while joining meetings, 
and/or can help users move from enterprise phones to mobile phones during meetings (e.g., 
switching audio).  
Consider an example architecture, as shown below in Figure 1, which illustrates 
various elements that can be utilized to facilitate techniques of this proposal.   
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Consider, in the context of Figure 1, various example use-cases in which techniques 
herein may be utilized to enhance/improve user experience (UX) for audio dial-in calls for 
teleconferences: 
1. A call originating from corporate/enterprise Voice-over-Internet Protocol 
(VOIP) phone (e.g., registered to enterprise call control) in which a 
participant dials-in to a teleconference bridge and the call is routed via a 
PSTN SIP edge of the enterprise as shown in Figure 1, in which: 
a. The participant tries to join a meeting from a primary desk phone; 
and/or 
b. The participants logs-in into any desk phone available using 
Extension mobility (e.g., the participant is still inside the enterprise 
network); 
2. A call originates from a cell phone in which the call is routed via an 
enterprise Dial-Via Office (DVO), as shown in Figure 1; 
3. A call originates from a cell phone to a teleconference bridge but the caller's 
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) is an enterprise-issued 
connection/number; 
4. A call originates from a traditional PSTN mobile phone (e.g. without an 
enterprise SIM card /connection) with no VOIP connection. Imagine, for 
example, that the user is outside the enterprise network and doesn't have an 
enterprise SIM card but wants to join a meeting; and/or 
5. In addition to these, the techniques of this proposal can also be used to 
improve the UX of a call switching from VOIP to PSTN. For example: 
5.1 If the VOIP (over the top path from enterprise to cloud) media path 
quality is bad, there are techniques that allow the call to switch to 
PSTN path or a teleconference participant can use PSTN path for 
the audio portion of the teleconference. When this occurs, instead of 
the participant being required to provide a meeting identity (ID) 
again, the techniques of this proposal can be used to send a session 
identifier that can help the cloud teleconference service recognize 
that the participant is already participating in the setup call. 
5
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In some instances for use-cases, 1-3 and 5, the enterprise phones can maintain a 
calendar service (e.g., once the user logs-in), based on in which the calendar service can 
fetch the teleconference details (e.g., teleconference/meeting (ID), access code, etc.) and 
later use the meeting details with the STIR/SHAKEN framework in order to join dial-in 
teleconferences automatically.   
Whereas, for use-case 4, the enterprise phones can reach out to the user's personal 
PSTN phone (VOIP or Not VOIP) in order to remind the user about an ongoing 
teleconference (e.g., by using a calendar service, as explained above).  In one instance, the 
user can be presented with an Interactive Voice Response (IVR) service that indicates, as 
an example, "You have a Meeting XXXX, Press 1 to join here."  In this example, one the 
user confirms (e.g., by pressing 1), the enterprise phone first joins the dial-in bridge with 
the meeting details (as explained above) and then transfers the PSTN phone the 
teleconference bridge. 
Here, before transferring, the phone can notify the teleconference dial-in bridge 
regarding a call transfer that is going to happen (e.g., using additional custom fields in a 
STIR token, beyond those discussed), so that the teleconference dial-in bridge can 
authenticate the PSTN user and patch the user in place of the enterprise phone.  
Although various examples provided herein are discussed with reference to an 
audio teleconference, it is to be understood that the techniques of this proposal can be 
equally applied to video teleconferences in which the audio portion of the teleconference 
involves PSTN dial-in at some point during a teleconference workflow. 
Based on the architecture as illustrated in Figure 1, consider various details of the 
techniques of this proposal.  STIR is a framework that enables the cryptographic assertion 
and verification of the identity of a caller. While the STIR framework allows a 
caller/authentication server to cryptographically assert a caller identity via the SIP Identity 
header field in a SIP INVITE, existing deployment realities would make it difficult if not 
impossible for the Identity header field value to be preserved end-to-end (e2e) from caller 
to callee. This is in large part due to the significant deployment trail of legacy equipment 
in carrier networks. 
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Taking these deployment realities into consideration, STIR suggests an out-of-band 
mechanism, as can prescribed at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-stir-oob/ in 
which an entity that cryptographically asserts caller identity (authentication service) places 
a full PASSporT [as prescribed by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request For 
Comments (RFC) 8255] in a rendezvous service referred to as a Call Placement Service 
(CPS). To verify the identity of the caller, the verification service running at the callee 
contacts the same CPS to obtain, decrypt, and verify the PASSporT identity assertion. 
Consider various operations or steps that can be performed to implement the 
techniques of this proposal. As a first step (1), an extension to the STIR PASSporT token 
is proposed that can be provided by inserting new "claims" in the token that are e2e 
encrypted. This new claim will carry additional information, as shown below in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: New Claim Section Added to a STIR PASSporT Token 
 
 For a second step (2), RFC 8225, Section 8 describes that a PASSporT JWT can be 
extended using any protocol.  Thus, the JWT header of a PASSporT token can be enhanced 
to include a "ppt" type "meetingsContext" as per the RFC 8225, Section 8.01 
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For a third step (3), a new meeting context extension claim called "mtgCtxt" is 
proposed that can be added on top of the base JWT claims ("Orig," "dest," and "mky") as 
defined in RFC 8225.  The various fields are described in Figure 2, above.  Below is an 
example instance of how the extension may look to a user who has one meeting scheduled 






"accessCode" : 123456 
} 
 
If the INVITE sent out is for an already setup call (e.g., a participant uses a 
teleconferencing application to join but audio is provided via PSTN or the participant 
initially calls-in using a computer but switches audio mid-way), then in such cases 
additional context information can be carried that will carry a session identifier of an 
already setup session. Further, in cases where a transfer is being performed, the original 
STIR can be referenced so that the cloud teleconferencing server can determine that the 
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JoinAutomatically: True // optional for cases where user is already authenticated 





For a fourth step (4), the new claim can be a JSON portion that is e2e encrypted 
using a key that is shared between the enterprise and the cloud teleconference service. 
Various techniques may be utilized to facilitate the e2e key derivation, as follows: 
 The enterprise and the cloud teleconference service can exchange the 
verification keys out-of-band (e.g., via a Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) channel or other similar means). Given that the enterprise and cloud 
teleconference service already will have some association (e.g., a site admin 
account, etc.), the exchange can be performed using a public/private key 
pair to exchange the e2e key on a secure connection between the enterprise 
and the cloud teleconference service; 
 An enterprise administrator, via a continuous integration (CI) token, can 
create and push the e2e keys to the cloud by calling a secure Application 
Programming Interface (API) that the cloud teleconference service can 
expose. For example: 
POST https:/teleconf.service.com/api/v1/e2eKeys 
{OrgID, e2eKey, e2eKeyIdentifier} 
 The e2e key can be derived by exchanging a Key Derivation Function (KDF) 
'salt' using a secret that is pre-configured on-site for the enterprise 
administrator account and is known to both the enterprise and the cloud 
teleconference service.  It should be noted that there can more than one key 
exchanged along with a "kid" between the enterprise and the cloud 
teleconference service in this example. 
 
For a fifth step (5), the "mtgCtxt" claims in the STIR PASSporT will be encrypted 
using one of the keys, derived as described above, whose "kid" will be conveyed in the 
9
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JSON Web Encryption (JWE) header of the JWT.  The encrypted JSON claims would have 
a JWE header with a kid that will help the destination side fetch right keying material to 
decrypt the encrypted portion of the JWT.  The JWE header will be base64 encoded and 
the "mtgCtxt" overall will be generated using procedures as prescribed by RFC 7516. 










 For a sixth step (6), the encrypted claim will be nested inside the PASSporT token 
as a new claim and sent in INVITE via an Internet Telephony Service Path (ITSP) 
path/PSTN path. The existing STIR procedures of RFC 8225 will be applied to sign the 
entire STIR token, which will also include the "mtgCtxt" claim section. 
 For a seventh step (7), consider that typically, for a PSTN call, the ITSP provider 
(e.g., service provider) will generate a STIR token.  The service provider will likely have 
infrastructure or partners to generate the token.  In some instances, a PSTN service within 
call manager cloud can for enterprise by partnering with STIR/SHAKEN vendors. 
 Various potential flows are possible for the seventh step.  Figure 3, below, 
illustrates an example flow in which an ITSP provider adds the STIR token on the outbound 
INVITEs obtained from an enterprise. For example, an enterprise phone can make the call 
that gets routed via the PSTN ITSP. In this case, one implementation may just allow the 
ITSP perform the STIR token creation. For the flow, the enterprise will pass the "mtgCtxt" 
in a custom SIP header of an outgoing INVITE to its partner ITSP provider. The ITSP 
partner will create STIR token and while doing so, pick up the "mtgCtxt" from the SIP 
header passed by the enterprise and add the "mtgCtxt" while creating the PASSporT. Given 
that "mtgCtxt" is encrypted, the ITSP will not be able to tamper with the "mtgCtxt" blob. 
10
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Various key steps illustrated in the call flow include that enterprise will generate 
encrypted claims using the procedures of RFC 7516. The claims can various content as 
discussed above for the first step and will be added to the x-mtgCtxt SIP header. An 
example header may be formatted as, x-mtgCtxt: token <value>, where <value> is an RFC 
7516 encoded token (whose header is base64 encoded and can provide the kid to use).  
Next, the ITSP attaches this as a new claim to STIR PASSporT and signs the entire passport 
following procedures of RFC 8225.  
Optionally, the STIR token can be placed in CPS and fetched using the called 
number as per existing procedures. In different implementations, a CPS service can be 
implemented by service providers, third-party providers, a cloud telephony provider that 
also provides a PSTN break out, or even facilitated through partnerships among different 
providers. Thus, three CPS models may be possible.  A first model may include service 
providers owning a CPS service and an originating service provider (e.g. that is connected 
to the enterprise for the flow of Figure 3) will sign/generate the STIR and a terminating SP 
(that connects to cloud teleconference service edge) will validate the STIR token with using 
CPS (whenever e2e SIP is not involved). A second model may include a third-party owning 
a CPS service and partnering with an enterprise.  A third model may include a cloud 
provider owning a CPS service (e.g., a PSTN service or PSTN edge that can own/operate 
a signing authority over many numbers owned by the provider).     
Continuing with the present flow, at the terminating side, the termITSP validates 
the STIR token, picks up the "mtgCtxt" portion, and sends this portion in the INVITE x-
mtgCtxt SIP header to the cloud teleconference service.  Thereafter, the cloud 
teleconference service performs a base64 decode, obtains the kid from the header, fetches 
the appropriate keying material of the corresponding enterprise organization ID (OrgID) 
and decrypts the "mtgCtxt" portion. 
In cases where the call is originated by a mobile device (e.g., use-cases 2 and 3 
above), the ITSP (if it happens to be a partner of the cloud teleconference service) can 
detect that the called number is a teleconference toll-free number/meeting number and can 
call an API into a service exposed by enterprise to determine the encrypted blob. 
 For an eighth step (8, continuing from the seventh step, noted above), consider that 
on the termination side (e.g., cloud teleconference service edge where the server peers with 
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the terminating ITSP), the ITSP validates the STIR token and will extract the claims portion 
(e.g., JWE encrypted claims), inserts a new X-header (e.g., x-mtgCtxt), and can send the 
same in the forwarded INVITE from ITSP to the cloud teleconference service edge can 
simply forward the PASSporT to the edge and have the edge itself validate the STIR token 
(e.g., a delegated validation).   
 Thus, techniques proposed herein can be provided in-line as extensions to the 
standard RFC for the STIR PASSporT.  The STIR token will be carried e2e, from the 
perspective of an originating service provider to a terminating service provider and the 
existing relationship between the service providers and an enterprise/cloud teleconference 
service will ensure that data is forwarded e2e.  Middle boxes can validate any known 
extensions (e.g., any standardized extensions) and pass across the token and any other 
claims that are not understood.  The new claims proposed herein are e2e encrypted for the 
purpose of protecting the information from being viewed/tampered with by any 
PSTNs/service providers. 
Accordingly, various teleconference/meeting experience improvements once the 
edge validates the encrypted claim (after decrypting with appropriate keying material) can 
be provided. For example, currently when a user joins a teleconference via a PSTN path, 
the user's enterprise identity cannot be asserted. However, the "mtgCtxt" claim of this 
proposal can carry the enterprise identity of a user, which can help to solve this problem.  
Further, currently when a user joins a teleconference via a meeting application or other 
device but uses a phone to dial-in to the audio portion of teleconference, there will be two 
users shown in roster/participant list.  This proposal provides for solving this problem in 
order to facilitate relating the two users by means of correlating a "mtgCtxt" session 
identifier and an enterprise identity of the user. 
Additionally, in some instances, the service that plays teleconference/meeting 
prompts (e.g., a GIVR service) can use the encrypted claims as a first level of authentication 
(as the encrypted claims are signed using a key known only to the enterprise and the cloud 
teleconference service) and can directly progress to the step at which it can validate a 
second factor of a given participant (e.g., personal identification number (PIN), password, 
voice fingerprint, etc.). 
13
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Further, the display name in the roster of a teleconference/meeting, once an 
attendee has joined, can reflect the actual name of the attendee as fetched from the 
"mtgCtxt" claim.  Additionally, since the cloud teleconference service is able to verify the 
identity of a participant that has joined via a PSTN path, the cloud server can use this 
identity to fetch further information for the participant, such as a people insight profile, 
social graph of the participant, etc. 
In the case of a call being switched from VOIP to PSTN (e.g., if a participant 
initially joined via a VOIP path), then the mtgCtxt claim can also carry a call reference 
and/or call identifier of the earlier session in order to help stitch/relate to the previous 
session and, hence, send the media back to the same media bridge, optimize resource 
allocation, etc. 
Still further, the "mtgCtxt" can also carry keying material for cases in which e2e 
encryption for audio is desired.  Since "mtgCtxt" is carried securely over PSTN path, this 
can be used to carry any keying material and then can be used to exchange/derive actual 
Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) keys in the media path. 
As noted, CPS is primarily a service intended to carry STIR tokens out-of-band.  
Thus, it is possible to de-couple the enhanced token/context information of this proposal 
and not carry it in PASSporT. In one instance, to decouple the enhanced token from a 
STIR/PASSporT token, a third-party/cloud CPS service provider can offer a new service 
in which an additional entry can be provided in a CPS table row to store this context (and 
potentially offer this to customers, for example, via  PSTN offering).  Thereafter, the 
context can be used by an enterprise in order to push the additional meeting context whose 
identifier could be a calling/called number or any other existing unique identifier (e.g., 
meeting ID, etc.) in order to correlate an incoming SIP INVITE from a PSTN service with 
the context in order to fetch the context from the table.  In such a case, the enterprise can 
avail this service to store the additional context information (here "mtgCtxt") and have the 
cloud teleconference service edge fetch the context when the incoming SIP call hits the 
edge from PSTN. 
In summary, provided herein are techniques through which additional context 
information via a PSTN SIP path from an originating network (e.g., an enterprise/cloud 
teleconference service) to a terminating network (e.g., an enterprise/cloud teleconference 
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service, depending on the direction of the call.  The additional context information (e.g., 
"mtgCtxt") can include an organization identity of a user, meeting/teleconference details 
(where possible), and e2e keying material that can be used to derive e2e keys (e.g., for 
cases in which Secure Media Frames (SFRAME) may be used).  Thus, various 
problems/challenges of current implementations can be solved by the novel techniques of 
this proposal in which an extension is provided to the STIR PASSporT JWT that includes 
a new claims section that can be encrypted and secured e2e such that only an enterprise 
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